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TOWARDS LOW EMISSIONS IN THE ELECTRICITY GENERATION SECTOR: CREATING A 
COHERENT LEGAL MODEL FOR AUSTRALIA 
Shol Blustein* 
Australia’s efforts to transition to a low-emissions economy have stagnated 
following the successive defeats of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme.  
This failure should not, however, be regarded as the end of Australia’s efforts to 
make this transition.  In fact, the opportunity now exists for Australia to refine its 
existing arrangements to enable this transition to occur more effectively.  The 
starting point for this analysis is the legal arrangements applying to the 
electricity generation sector, which is the largest sectoral emitter of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in Australia.  Without an effective 
strategy to mitigate this sector’s contribution to anthropogenic climate change, it 
is unlikely that Australia will be able to transition towards a low-emissions 
economy.  It is on this basis that this article assesses the dominant national 
legal arrangement – the Renewable Energy Target – underpinning the electricity 
generation sector's efforts to become a low-emissions sector. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The release of a number of high profile scientific reports published during the last decade have 
propelled the issue of anthropogenic climate change into the mainstream of social and political 
discourse.  The Fourth Assessment Report,1 the most prominent of these reports, concluded 
that the environmental, economic and health dangers posed by anthropogenic climate change 
are “unequivocal”2 and that “there is [a] very high [likelihood that] ... global atmospheric 
concentrations of [greenhouse gases] have increased markedly as a result of human 
activities”.3 
Economic reports also inform the developing climate change consciousness in Australia and 
overseas.4  The dominant message advanced in these reports is that without timely and 














impacts of this problem will likely be exacerbated.5  These reports also consider a range of 
regulatory approaches to address this problem and conclude that a single market-based6 
regulatory instrument is essential to “facilitate the big switch away”7 from those activities that 
contribute to anthropogenic climate change. 
It is on the basis of these economic and scientific reports that in 2008 the Australian 
Government developed the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS).  The purpose of the 
CPRS was to deliver a regulatory framework which could enable a structured and progressive 
shift in the Australian economy towards a lower anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
base.  The CPRS, relying predominantly on the recommendations set out in the Garnaut 
Review, supported an economy-wide cap-and-trade scheme8 which uses market forces to 
incentivise the transition away from the anthropocentric activities that produce anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Following three failed attempts and significant cross-party 
negotiation, the CPRS has been removed from the Labor Government’s strategy to 
decarbonise the Australian economy.  Despite this, it is likely that a cap-and-trade scheme will 


































Despite the Labor Government’s reliance on an economy-wide approach to shift Australia 
towards a low-emissions base, this approach is not the only method that can be used to 
decarbonise Australia’s economy.  It is on this basis that this article moves away from 
considering the application of a large-scale whole-of-economy regulatory approach to lower 
Australia’s anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions base.  Instead, this article focuses on the 
electricity generation sector9 and, more particularly, the dominant legal arrangement applying to 
decarbonise this sector. 
The electricity sector poses the greatest challenges to Australia’s ambitions to shift to a low 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions base while also providing the greatest opportunity to 
achieve this transition in the foreseeable future.  In terms of the opportunities, the authors of the 
Zero Carbon Australia Stationary Energy Plan10 note that Australia can fully decarbonise its 
base load stationary energy sector (both electricity and heat) by 2020 through the deployment 
of commercially available renewable technologies.11 
On the other hand, the available data reflects the challenges to make this shift.  In 2008, the 
stationary energy sector emitted 51 per cent of Australia’s anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions, of which the electricity sector contributed 68 per cent.12  Further, the Australian 
Government noted that the emissions from the stationary energy sector “are projected to 
average 293 Mt CO2-e per annum over the Kyoto period (2008-2012)[, which] represents a 50 
per cent increase over the 1990 level”.13  This challenge is compounded by the fact that 
renewable sourced electricity contributes only 6.5 per cent of the electricity currently generated 
for public consumption in Australia.14  Together, these factors provide compelling reasons why 
the shift in Australia towards a low anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions base must begin 
with the electricity sector. 
When considering the strategies to minimise the contribution of the electricity sector to 
anthropogenic climate change, it is important to recognise the “panoply of difficulties”15 
presented by this issue.  The most important of these is Australia’s (and, more generally, the 


















economic prosperity.16  Put differently, this means that when designing an effective transitional 
strategy for Australia, it is necessary to maintain an adequate and secure supply of electricity 
which is capable of meeting growing demand.  To do so, it is therefore important that the 
transition towards a low-emissions electricity sector occurs without disrupting Australia’s supply 
of electricity.17 
While significant emphasis must be placed on the electricity sector’s efforts to decarbonise, it is 
important to recognise that no single economic sector offers a complete solution to the problem 
of anthropogenic climate change.  This means that significant efforts, particularly in relation to 
the transport and agricultural sectors (which are the next largest emitting sectors in the 
Australian economy) remain necessary to avoid the dangerous tipping points which scientists 
contend will occur if effective and timely mitigation of anthropogenic climate change does not 
occur.18 
This article considers these and other related issues.  It begins by considering the emergence 
of the national, State and Territory approaches to mitigating the electricity sector's contribution 
to anthropogenic climate change.  This overview provides the historical context for the 
emergence of the national legal approach to decarbonising the electricity sector.  The article 
then considers the emergence and operation of the dominant legal approach operating at the 
national level in Australia – the Renewable Energy Target (RET) scheme – to decarbonise the 
electricity sector. 
In the next section the article moves away from the Australian context to consider the design 
features of the dominant legal mechanisms developed to decarbonise the electricity sectors in 























operating in conjunction with tradable green certificate schemes19 and price-based feed-in tariff 
mechanisms.  The purpose of this section is to consider the optimal design features of these 
legal mechanisms.  By doing this, this section is able to inform the development of an effective 
legal framework to decarbonise the Australian electricity sector. 
Finally the author considers the role of electricity-centric legal mechanisms within the context of 
a whole-of-economy cap-and-trade scheme.  The purpose of this analysis is to emphasise that 
legal arrangements applying to the electricity sector need to coexist with broader economy-
wide measures in order to enable a structured and progressive shift in the Australian economy 
towards a lower anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions base. 
2. THE EMERGENCE OF REGULATION TO DECARBONISE THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR IN AUSTRALIA 
Australia’s efforts to mitigate the electricity sector’s contribution to anthropogenic climate 
change began in 1992 with the ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change.20  In the same year, the Gas and Electricity Combining Efficiency and 
Greenhouse report was issued by the Senate Standing Committee on Industry, Science and 
Technology.21  One of the central recommendations made by this report was for the Australian 
electricity sector to mitigate its contribution to anthropogenic climate change by increasing the 
use of “natural gas ... for power generation”.22  To do so, this report notes that targeted 
government intervention is required to displace the dominance of coal-fired electricity 
generation. 
Following the publication of the Gas and Electricity Combining Efficiency and Greenhouse 
report, numerous studies have considered the mechanisms available for governments to 
mitigate the electricity sector’s (and, more generally, Australia’s) contribution to anthropogenic 






















trade scheme is the most appropriate form of regulation to achieve this objective.24  Despite the 
consistent views put forward in these reports, Australia continues to debate the efficacy of a 
cap-and-trade scheme together with other market-based and prescriptive25 regulatory 
mechanisms to assist with Australia’s decarbonisation. 
Pre-dating most of these debates, the Generator Efficiency Standards (GES) were introduced 
in 2000.  These standards are commonly regarded as the first major Commonwealth 
Government initiative to reduce the electricity sector’s contribution to anthropogenic climate 
change.  The objective of the GES was to achieve a “movement towards best practice in the 
efficiency of fossil-fuelled electricity generation, and to deliver reductions in the greenhouse gas 
intensity of energy supply”.26  This program imposed reporting requirements and efficiency 
improvements on large-scale electricity generation facilities.27  The GES also included 
performance standards for new generation plants. 
While the scope of this article is limited to the national efforts to decarbonise the electricity 
generation sector, a number of Australian States and Territories have also developed legal 
approaches to support the deployment of renewable electricity.  In 2003, the New South Wales-
based Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme (GGAS) was implemented.28  This scheme uses a 
































with, among other things, the production and use of electricity.  One of the primary objectives of 
this scheme is to reduce per capita CO2-e of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to 7.27 
tonnes in New South Wales by using supply-and-demand side market-based techniques.30  To 
do so, this scheme provides for, among other things, the creation of tradable certificates (a 
National Greenhouse Abatement Certificates) by persons who generate electricity “in a manner 
that results in reduced emissions of greenhouse gases”.31 
The Australian Capital Territory Government also introduced a Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Scheme, which commenced on 1 January 2005.  The ACT scheme mirrors the New South 
Wales GGAS scheme.32  More recently, in September 2010, the ACT announced plans to 
expand its existing small-scale feed-in tariff mechanism to include large-scale renewable 
electricity generators.  This scheme is scheduled to commence in 2011.33 
The Victorian and Queensland governments have also developed legal frameworks to increase 
the use of low-emissions technology for large-scale electricity generation.  In 2004, the 
Queensland Government introduced the 13 per cent Gas Scheme, now known as the 
Queensland Gas Scheme.34  When it was first designed, this scheme required that at least 13 
per cent of electricity sold by retailers in Queensland be generated from gas.  The threshold 
under this scheme has now increased to 18 per cent. 
In 2007, the Victorian Government implemented a renewable energy scheme similar to the 
Commonwealth RET (which is discussed in more detail below).35  Victoria is now in the process 
of transitioning this scheme into the national scheme.  This process is scheduled for completion 
by the end of 2010.36  Further, in July 2010 the Victorian Government announced plans for a 






















3. THE EMERGENCE AND OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGET SCHEME 
In 2000, the Commonwealth Government introduced the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target 
(or the MRET) scheme.38  When this scheme commenced in 2001, its purpose was to increase 
Australia’s renewable sourced electricity by 9,500 GWh (or approximately two per cent) from its 
current levels by 2020.  In 2009, the MRET (or, as it was renamed in 2009, the RET) scheme 
was amended to ensure that by 2020 approximately 20 per cent of Australia's electricity supply 
(approximately 60,000 GWh, which includes about 15,000 GWh of existing renewable 
generation capacity) is generated from renewable energy sources.39  At the same time this 
scheme was extended to 2030.40 
The RET scheme requires wholesale purchasers of electricity on grids with a capacity of 
greater than 100 megawatts to acquire renewable energy certificates (RECs) equivalent to a 
percentage of their annual electricity purchases, which they are then required to surrender to 
the scheme’s regulator – the Renewable Energy Regulator – on an annual basis.41  RECs are 
created by the scheme’s regulator and transferred to eligible renewable electricity generators.42  
These certificates correspond to renewable-based electricity that has been generated and 
consumed anywhere in Australia.43  Failure to remit sufficient RECs incurs a penalty or, using 
the language of the governing statute, a shortfall charge.44   
By selling RECs using the available secondary market, renewable electricity generators receive 
a payment (equal to the value of the RECs they have sold on market) which operates to 
subsidise the renewable electricity which generators have produced.  The operation of this 
market overcomes the need for liable firms to self-generate or physically purchase energy from 
renewable energy sources.  In addition, renewable electricity generators also receive payment 
for the electricity they generate.  This is separate from the payment they receive for the sale of 
the RECs.  By providing a subsidy together with a payment for the generation of renewable 
electricity, this scheme not only encourages the deployment of renewable generation facilities, 
it also facilitates the "location and technical design of renewable energy projects"45 in order to 
















In May 2010, McLennan Magasanik Associates (MMA) conducted an analysis of the effect of 
the revised 20 per cent target under the RET scheme.  According to MMA, under the 20 per 
cent target, total renewable electricity generation is projected to reach 66,000 GWh in 2020, up 
from 27,000 GWh in 2010.47  In terms of the contribution made by large and small-scale 
technologies, large-scale technologies are projected to contribute 39,000 GWh and small-scale 
ones approximately 11,000 GWh.48  The remaining 16,000 GWh is made up of the renewable 
electricity sources existing prior to the implementation of the RET scheme.49  On this basis, 
renewable electricity is expected to contribute approximately 22 per cent of Australia’s total 
electricity generation by 2020.50 
Translating the targets of the RET scheme into anthropogenic greenhouse gas emission 
reductions, the Australian Government projects that by 2020 the RET scheme will reduce 35 Mt 
of CO2-e.51  For Australia to reduce its anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by five per 
cent by 2020 from 2000 levels (which Australia committed to at the 15th session of the 
Conference of the Parties meeting to the Kyoto Protocol52 in Copenhagen in December 
2009),53 Australia must abate a total of 144 Mt CO2-e.54  When one considers that the electricity 
sector contributes approximately 35 per cent of Australia’s current anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions,55 the removal by the RET scheme of approximately 24 per cent of these 
emissions by 2020 is substantially less than the electricity sector’s contribution to Australia’s 
overall anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions profile.56 
Further, if an internationally binding agreement is reached, Australia has offered to increase its 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emission reduction target to 25 per cent by 2020 from 2000 
levels.57  This means that Australia must abate a total of 255 Mt CO2-e, of which the renewable 
























anthropogenic greenhouse gas emission reductions required according to the projected 
abatement levels under the current scheme.58 
In terms of the design of the RET scheme, the Renewable Opportunities report59 is the most in-
depth analysis undertaken in this regard since this scheme’s commencement.  This report, 
which was published in 2003, contains a number of recommendations and findings that are 
premised on the design of the RET as it was in 2003.  Of these recommendations, two 
reappear in more recent studies and are explored in more detail below as they indicate 
significant design flaws of the RET scheme. 
First, the Renewable Opportunities report submits that the “MRET is a relatively expensive 
abatement measure”60 because of the high cost of renewable technologies.  Along the same 
line, energy consultants MMA note that the RET scheme is insufficient to achieve long-term, 
cost-effective reductions in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.61  MMA also note that 
the current RET scheme is not capable of developing cost-effective energy infrastructure 
required to meet the increasing electricity demand in Australia.62 
The second relevant conclusion posited in the Renewable Opportunities report notes that to 
maintain a consistent level of investment for renewable electricity projects under this scheme – 
rather than “a boom and bust”63 approach – the scheme must periodically raise the eligibility 
criteria threshold for renewable energy generation facilities.64  By doing this, the scheme can 
ensure that these generation facilities continue to improve their generation capabilities which, in 
turn, drives investment in new generation facilities.  This latter recommendation recently 
received renewed support in the submission to the 2009 exposure draft Renewable Energy 
Target scheme amendments prepared by the Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets.65  
This submission notes that to address this issue, the eligible facilities under the RET scheme 
require “a sunset period to restrict the time period over which projects can earn RECs” so that 
new investment in renewable electricity receives continued support.66 
The criticisms set out in the above reports together with the available data indicating the 
















aspects of this scheme.  It is on this basis that the next section considers the two dominant 
legal mechanisms that have been used extensively in foreign domestic jurisdictions to mitigate 
the electricity sector’s contribution to anthropogenic climate change.  The purpose of this 
analysis is to consider how these model arrangements might be used to improve the current 
legal arrangements in Australia. 
4. LEGAL MECHANISMS AVAILABLE TO INCREASE RENEWABLE-SOURCED ELECTRICITY GENERATION 
This section is concerned with understanding the design principles of the two dominant legal 
mechanisms which have been developed to decarbonise the electricity sector in various 
industrialised nation-states.  This assessment begins by reviewing the price-based model – 
which is commonly known as a feed-in tariff mechanism – which is the mechanism most 
frequently used in Europe to overcome the "well-established dominant electricity supply 
technologies".67  This article then considers the design principles of a quota based mechanism 
that operates in conjunction with a tradable green certificate scheme, which is the legal 
mechanism on which the Australian RET scheme is based. 
It is important to note that during the formative years of renewable electricity technology 
development, government intervention in the renewable electricity sector focussed on 
supporting research through funding and development projects for the purposes of creating and 
commercialising new technologies.68  More recently, however, the emphasis has moved to a 
market-pull approach (compared to the former market-push approach), which relies on the 
creation of incentives to encourage the development, commercialisation and dissemination of 
renewable electricity technologies.69  It is this latter approach that underpins the legal 
mechanisms discussed in this section.  Despite the shift towards a market-pull approach, 
sustained research and development remains important for the advancement of renewable 
technologies and, therefore, must not be forgotten in the broader regulatory approach to 
decarbonising the electricity sector. 
Before commencing the review of the dominant market-based mechanisms it is worth pausing 
to consider the role of prescriptive regulation to assist with the decarbonisation of the electricity 
sector.  Prescriptive regulation, which historically was the preferred form of regulation to 
manage environmental problems, imposes rules that prescribe specifically how an entity must 
act.70  Proponents of prescriptive regulation hold that this regulatory approach provides 











course of action.71  Further, it is said that market-based mechanisms defer the obligation to 
firms that can negotiate and, possibly, manipulate the market to avoid compliance.72  On the 
other hand, the common criticism levelled at prescriptive regulation is that because of its direct 
nature it limits the flexibility and autonomy of the liable firms, which they may otherwise be 
afforded under a market-based approach.73 
Despite the shift away from prescriptive regulation, a growing number of scholars support the 
view that this form of regulation has an important role to play alongside emerging market-based 
regulations.74  This view holds that 
we must inquire as to the wisdom of relying largely upon market mechanisms – albeit artificially 
constructed markets – in order to solve such a complex and difficult problem with so many 
causes, when the problem was caused by market failure in the first place.75 
While the primary purpose of this article is to assess the design of the existing Australian RET 
scheme, it is important to keep in mind that market-based mechanisms do not offer the only 
solution.  For this reason, based on the more moderate approach suggested by Gunningham, 
Bonyhady and Prest, it is sensible to consider the application of both market-based and 
prescriptive regulations within the broader regulatory approach to shift the electricity sector to a 
low-emissions base.  With this in mind the article now considers the two dominant legal 
mechanisms that have been used to decarbonise the electricity sector. 
4.1. FEED-IN TARIFF MECHANISMS 
The most common design for a feed-in tariff mechanism compels electricity retailers to enable 
renewable electricity generation facilities to connect to the electricity grid.  Electricity retailers 
are then required to purchase any electricity generated by the connected renewable electricity 





















In addition to the fixed price paid for electricity, the payments offered to participants in feed-in 
mechanisms are guaranteed for a period of time, which is usually for a period of 10 to 20 
years.77  The purpose of this design is two-fold.  First, it is intended to provide renewable 
electricity generators with price certainty so that investors are able to calculate the return on 
investment from the renewable electricity source which allows investors to determine the 
economic viability of developing and operating a renewable electricity generation facility.78  
Secondly, the premium paid to renewable electricity generators is intended to incentivise the 
development of new renewable electricity generation plants. 
While the basic operation of a feed-in mechanism is relatively straightforward, Mendonca, 
Jacobs and Sovacool have provided a useful overview of the "Basic FIT (feed-in tariff) Design 
Options"79 together with the aspects of "Bad FIT Designs".80  The authors note that 13 issues 
must be addressed when designing an effective feed-in tariff mechanism.81  While each of the 
13 issues is relevant to the design of an effective feed-in tariff mechanism, "one of the most 
urgent questions"82 relates to the level of the tariff. 
The basic premise for policy makers when setting the tariff is that it must be set at a level that is 
not too low – as this does not encourage investment in renewable energy – nor too high – as 
this may cause windfall gains for renewable electricity generators.83  The tariff must therefore 
be set at a rate that is at a slight premium to the real costs involved in generating the electricity, 
which is likely to be different for each type of renewable technology.84  The level of the tariff is 
also dependent on the location of the generation facility and the size of the renewable electricity 
plant as economies of scale dictate that larger generation facilities are often cheaper and 
therefore require fewer subsidies.85  Further, this premium must be set at a rate that is 























ensures that the profitability of these projects is sufficient to attract investors to renewable 
sourced electricity generation.86 
Closely related to the level of the tariff is the guaranteed duration of the payment of the tariff.  
Mendonca, Jacobs and Sovacool note that the duration of the scheme affects the level of the 
tariff because, if, for example, the guaranteed duration is only 10 years (which is a relatively 
short period) then the level of the tariff needs to be set at a higher rate to ensure that the 
investors receive an adequate return on their investment over that period.87  Alternatively, 
longer tariff periods allow the tariff level to be set at a lower rate as the return on investment 
can be spread over the duration of the tariff.88  On this basis, it is evident that the price certainty 
offered by feed-in tariff mechanisms is the critical factor driving the operation of this approach. 
While it is not the focus of this section to consider in any great depth the practical application of 
feed-in tariff mechanisms, it is useful to note that at September 2009, 25 European countries, 
12 Asian countries and a number of Australian States and Territories used feed-in tariff 
mechanisms.89  Of these jurisdictions, Germany is regarded as the "worldwide leader in this 
area".90  The push in Germany towards greater use of renewable sourced electricity began in 
the 1970s and culminated in 1990 with the initial version of its current feed-in tariff 
mechanism.91  While the German feed-in tariff mechanism was problematic during its formative 
years, this scheme has been effective in increasing the number of facilities capable of 
generating renewable electricity.  For example, in 2009, renewable-sourced electricity 
contributed 16.4 per cent of Germany’s electricity matrix, which is an increase of over 12 per 
cent since the implementation of the feed-in tariff scheme in 1990.92 
In addition to the capacity deployment of renewable electricity generation facilities, the German 
scheme also performed well with reducing costs and prices of renewable electricity 





















scheme builds “in annual decline rates (and no compensation for inflation)”,94 which means that 
tariff rates decrease in line with the learning curves of specific technologies.95  The German 
application of a feed-in tariff mechanism indicates that a properly-designed feed-in tariff 
mechanism is capable of generating significant growth in renewable electricity generation while, 
at the same time, reducing the costs of the technologies being deployed under this scheme. 
4.2. QUOTA MECHANISM 
Quota mechanisms operate to encourage the deployment of renewable sourced electricity by 
mandating a percentage or a total amount of electricity that must be sourced from eligible 
renewable electricity generation technologies during a particular period.  To achieve the 
scheme’s “quota”, electricity generators or retailers (depending on the scheme’s design) must 
acquire RECs – which represent an amount of renewable sourced electricity – equivalent to the 
percentage or amount of their annual electricity sales (for generators) or purchases (for 
retailers).  Like the price component of the feed-in tariff mechanism, the stringency of the quota 
is determined by a political (rather than market) means.96  Liable entities must surrender those 
certificates to the regulator, failure of which generally incurs a penalty that exceeds the market 
price for the RECs.97 
Quota mechanisms frequently operate in conjunction with a secondary market in which the 
RECs can be traded.  This overcomes the need for liable firms to self-generate or physically 
purchase energy from low-emissions energy sources.98  The availability of the secondary 
market also provides liable firms with flexibility regarding compliance; firms can decide whether 
to satisfy its obligations by purchasing RECs on market or, instead, whether to generate their 
own renewable electricity.99  In addition (and as noted for the Australian RET scheme), 
renewable electricity generators also receive payment for the electricity they generate that is 
separate from the payment they receive for the sale of the RECs.  By providing a subsidy 
together with a payment for the generation of renewable electricity, this scheme not only 
encourages the deployment of renewable generation facilities, it also facilitates the optimal 















To be effective, a quota mechanism requires the following six pillars:101 
 a quota which specifies the percentage or total amount of electricity which liable entities 
must source from eligible renewable electricity generation technologies during a particular 
period; 
 a definition of eligible renewable sources which can receive RECs under the scheme; 
 clear identification of the point of liability (for example, at the point of generation or retail); 
 a regulated secondary market in RECs; 
 a government agency to regulate the operation of the program; and 
 a system which penalises non-compliance. 
As with the feed-in tariff mechanism, the quota system contains two core design features which 
determine this scheme’s ability to effectively encourage the deployment of renewable electricity 
generation facilities.  These features are: (i) the existence and level of the quota; and (ii) the 
operation of the market to encourage investment in renewable electricity generation.  While 
being the central tenets of a quota mechanism, these design elements of a quota-based 
mechanism also reflect the major design differences between quota and feed-in tariff 
mechanisms. 
The purpose of the quota is to set a minimum target for renewable-sourced electricity, which 
must be achieved within a predetermined timeframe.  The setting of the quota is often done so 
that there is a gradual progression towards the final mandated target.  By doing this, the 
deployment of renewable electricity generation facilities can occur gradually, which means that 
the initial price impact of the scheme is lessened for liable entities.102  From an energy security 
perspective, this gradual transition ensures that there is continual and secure supply of 
electricity because the phasing out of excess fossil fuel capacity can be managed gradually. 
The practical effect of setting renewable electricity targets has been mixed.  In Australia, for 
example, the RET (and the MRET before it) scheme has performed well in achieving its 
quota.103  However, as MacGill and Passey note, Australia has “only had to achieve a very 
modest target, operated within an energy market context that is now changing rapidly and did 
demonstrate some significant failings”.104  One such failing occurred following the amendments 









receive multiple RECs for generated electricity.105  This amendment largely caused the REC 
market to become flooded by RECs created by these technologies.  This, in turn, caused the 
price of RECs to plummet and led to a temporary suspension of a number of planned large-
scale renewable electricity generation facilities because of the reduced revenue stream, which 
would accrue to the generators as a result of the depressed REC price.106  This issue has since 
been addressed by further amendments to the RET scheme which took effect on 1 January 
2011.107 
In Britain, its quota mechanism – the Renewables Obligation (RO)108 – has led to an 
acceleration of renewable electricity construction.  Since 2002, the RO has tripled the level of 
renewable electricity in Britain from 1.8 per cent to 6.64 per cent, with the program generating 
approximately £1.4 billion annually to support the renewable electricity sector (as at June 
2010).109  However, despite these positive results, it has been noted by the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Economic Affairs that existing evidence relating to the performance of the 
RO “casts doubt [over] ... whether it will be feasible to increase the share of renewable 
energy”110 to meet the European Union-mandated target of 15 per cent. 
The second critical feature of a quota mechanism is the operation of a secondary market in 
which to trade RECs.  The use of a market to trade RECs means that, unlike the feed-in tariff 
mechanism, the return on investment under a quota scheme is not determined by the 
legislature or the relevant government authority overseeing the program at the outset of the 
scheme.111  Rather, it is dependent on the price of the RECs that are traded on the secondary 
market which, like any market, is determined by the liquidity and the scarcity of the products 
available on that market. 
One of the major drivers to use a market to support the deployment of renewable electricity 
technologies is that it achieves deployment at least cost.112  The rationale for this is that 




















greatest profit, will put downward price pressure on technology manufacturers and will also 
pressure developers for the best available locations for the generation of electricity.113  
However, data obtained in relation to the British RO indicates that, in combination with other 
measures, this mechanism “has led to prices for wind power ... [being] substantially above 
German rates by about 50 per cent, despite a wind resource that is far superior in the British 
case”.114  This point was reaffirmed by the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic 
Affairs which notes that “the cost per kWh of renewable electricity supported by the 
Renewables Obligation has been significantly higher than the amounts paid via feed-in tariffs 
abroad”.115 
The existence of a market also creates a potential for variability of the return on investment 
which can result in less certainty for investors.  This is a major problem for investors whose 
primary concern is the cost and return on investment rather than meeting a predetermined 
government quota.116  As a result, lower-cost technologies receive preferential treatment 
because they offer the least amount of financial risk to investors.117 
The British Government developed a process to overcome the disparity created by the REC 
market in favour of lower-cost renewable electricity technologies.  Under the current version of 
the RO, electricity retailers are required to move progressively towards purchasing 15 per cent 
of their electricity from renewable sources by 2020.118  The RO was initially designed so that all 
renewable electricity generated received the same number of renewable energy certificates (or, 
as they are known, Renewable Obligation Certificates).  This meant that, like under the 
Australian RET scheme, this scheme only focussed on “near market options”119 and not on 
those technologies that require greater financial assistance to achieve large-scale commercial 
deployment.  Recognising this shortcoming, the British Government amended the RO in 2009 
to include a banding process where different technologies receive different numbers of 




















development, the technology’s cost to develop and factors affecting optimal electricity 
generation capabilities.121 
Despite the recent efforts of the British Government to improve its quota-based mechanism, it 
is evident that these mechanisms have not shared the same success as feed-in tariff 
mechanisms in deploying large-scale renewable electricity technologies or in reducing the costs 
and prices of renewable electricity technologies. 
5. INTERACTION OF RENEWABLE-CENTRIC LEGAL MECHANISMS WITH AN ECONOMY-WIDE CAP-AND-TRADE 
SCHEME  
This article has considered the quota and feed-in tariff mechanisms within the vacuum of the 
electricity sector; however, in reality these mechanisms are likely to be required to interact with 
other overlapping legal mechanisms.  The most obvious example of such interaction exists with 
a broad-based cap-and-trade scheme that applies to the same entities to which the electricity-
focussed legal mechanisms apply.  Appreciating the affect that such overlapping schemes can 
have on one another is particularly important for Australia because of the existence of the RET 
scheme and the ongoing debate relating to the implementation of an economy-wide cap-and-
trade scheme.122 
In its submission to the Garnaut Review, the Productivity Commission considered the 
application of what it called “supplementary policies” under a broad economy-wide cap-and-
trade scheme.123  The central theme of the Productivity Commission’s submission was that 
supplementary policies, such as the existing Australian RET scheme, do not affect the quantity 
of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emission reductions achieved under a cap-and-trade 
scheme; rather, they merely influence how these reductions occur.124 
More recently, Morris reached a similar conclusion to that offered by the Productivity 
Commission in her analysis of a national quota mechanism and tradable green certificate 
scheme in the United States.  Morris concludes that when operating in conjunction with cap-
and-trade schemes, quota schemes fail to have any substantive bearing on the reductions in 















achieving the cap slightly more expensive and less flexible because it reduced the 
technological neutrality that would otherwise exist under a cap-and-trade scheme.126 
Based on these observations, it remains important to be cognisant of the affect electricity-
specific measures can have on economy-wide measures to decarbonise the broader economy.  
However, the role of decarbonising the electricity sector by decreasing its reliance on the 
anthropocentric activities that produce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is critical to 
the broader shift of the economy towards a low-emissions base.  For this reason, even with an 
economy-wide measure to decarbonise the Australian economy, it remains important to retain a 
legal framework that is designed specifically to encourage the dissemination of renewable 
electricity technologies and minimise the impact of fossil fuel-sourced electricity.  Further, 
despite the negative cost implications of a legal approach to decarbonise the electricity sector, 
an electricity-centric approach operates as an insurance policy to defend against the 
“experimental policy approach”127 of a cap-and trade scheme to effectively decarbonise this 
sector.128 
6. CONCLUSION 
Shifting the Australian electricity sector to a lower anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
base is the critical first step to decarbonising the Australian economy.  The purpose of this 
analysis has been to reflect on the design of the Australian RET scheme.  Based on this 
analysis, it is evident that the RET scheme is not nearly as effective or efficient as the feed-in 
tariff mechanism to achieve this objective. 
Despite the evidence supporting feed-in tariff mechanisms, careful consideration needs to be 
given to the possibility of amending the existing RET scheme so that it can match the 
achievements of the successful feed-in tariff mechanisms.  To do so, the two fundamental 
shortcomings of the RET scheme must be addressed.  These are: (i) the scheme’s inability to 
provide investors with adequate investment certainty; and (ii) the scheme’s inability to reduce 
the cost of more expensive renewable electricity technologies. 
Increasing the investment certainty of the REC market is a complex problem.  Investment 
certainty can be delivered through increased government intervention in the operation of the 
REC market such as that which operates under a feed-in tariff scheme which compels the 
purchase of generated renewable electricity for a long period of time at a particular rate.  This 








entities enter into long-term forward contracts for the sale of RECs above a floor price.129  By 
doing this, however, the Australian Government would limit its ability to amend this approach 
without having serious ramifications for entities participating in the scheme that rely on the 
existence of the floor price for the profitable operation of their renewable electricity generation 
facility.  In addition, “markets need some risk and uncertainty in order to function properly – it 
drives innovation and careful decision making”.130 
In relation to the second shortcoming of the RET scheme, the feed-in tariff provides a useful 
example of rating technologies based on their cost, size of the generation facility and optimal 
generation capabilities in order to encourage the deployment of different technologies.  The 
British Government recently implemented a banding process under its RO that operates to 
band the different eligible renewable technologies so that each technology receives a different 
level of financial return based on the above noted factors.  Applying a similar approach in a 
carefully considered manner is also a viable option for Australia. 
These suggestions are not intended to provide all of the answers to improving the operation of 
the RET scheme in Australia.  Rather, they are intended to address the dominant shortcomings 
of the dominant Australian legal approach to decarbonise the electricity sector by using the 
lessons that have been learned from the successful operation of feed-in tariff mechanisms.  
More important, however, is the conclusion that no particular approach possesses a perfect 
design.  For this reason, whichever legal approach is used to decarbonise the electricity sector, 
it must be designed so that it balances the competing concepts of certainty, economic 
efficiency, flexibility and security of electricity supply that are evident to differing degrees under 
a quota scheme, a feed-in tariff mechanism and prescriptive regulation.  Further, given the 
likelihood of a future economy-wide cap-and-trade scheme, the design of a legal approach to 
support the deployment of renewable electricity must also consider how it can operate 
effectively within and complement the broader economy-wide approach. 
Australia sits in a unique position to redress the problems caused by the fossil fuel dominated 
electricity sector.  It must not waste the opportunity to design an optimal legal model to shift the 
electricity sector towards a lower anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions base which can, in 
turn, drive Australia’s shift to a low-carbon economy. 
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